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Abstract
A wide range of stochastic processes that model the growth and decline of pop-
ulations exhibit a curious dichotomy: with certainty either the population goes
extinct or its size tends to infinity. There is a elegant and classical theorem that
explains why this dichotomy must hold under certain assumptions concerning
the process. In this note, I explore how these assumptions might be relaxed
further in order to obtain the same, or a similar conclusion, and obtain both
positive and negative results.
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1. Introduction
The ‘merciless dichotomy’ (Section 5.2 of [3]) concerning extinction refers
to a very general property of stochastic processes that describes the long-term
fate of populations. Roughly speaking, the result states that if there is always
a strictly positive chance the population could become extinct in the future
(depending, perhaps, on the current population size), then the population is
guaranteed to either become extinct or to grow unboundedly large. More pre-
cisely, a formal version of this result, due to Jagers (Theorem 2 of [4]), applies
to any sequence X1, X2, . . . , Xn . . . of non-negative real-valued random vari-
ables that are defined on some probability space and which is absorbing at 0
(i.e. Xn = 0⇒ Xn+1 = 0 for all n). It states that, provided:
P(∃r : Xr = 0|X1, X2, . . . , Xn) ≥ δx > 0 whenever Xn ≤ x (1)
holds for all positive integers n, then, with probability 1, either Xn → ∞ or a
value of n exists for which Xk = 0 for all k ≥ n (notice that δx can tend towards
0 at any rate as x grows). This result applies to a wide variety of stochastic
processes studied in evolutionary and population biology (e.g. Yule birth-death
models, branching processes etc) and the proof in [4] involves an elegant and
short application of the martingale convergence theorem.
Note that the processes in [4] (and here) need not be Markovian. Neverthe-
less, the lower-bound inequality condition in (1) has a Markovian-like feature
that it is required to hold for all values of X1, X2, . . . , Xn−1 whenever Xn is less
than x. This raises the question of how much this uniform bounding across the
previous history of the process might be relaxed without sacrificing the conclu-
sion of certain extinction or explosion. In this short note, we consider possible
extensions of Jagers’ theorem by weakening the assumption in (1). Specifi-
cally, we will consider a lower bound that conditions just on the event that
0 < Xn ≤ x, either alone or alongside another variable that is dependent on
(but less complete than) the past history X1, . . . , Xn−1.
First, we consider what happens if the probability in the lower bound (1)
were to condition just on 0 < Xn ≤ x. In this case, we describe a positive result
that delivers a slightly weaker conclusion than the original theorem of Jagers.
We then show that the full conclusion cannot be obtained by lower bounds
that condition solely on 0 < Xn ≤ x by exhibiting a specific counterexample.
However, in the final section, we show that the full conclusion of Jagers’ theorem
can be obtained by conditioning on 0 < Xn ≤ x, together with some partial
information concerning the past history of the process.
2. A simple general lemma and its consequence for bounded popula-
tions
We first present an elementary but general limit result, stated within the
usual notation of a probability space (Ω,Σ,P) consisting of a sigma-algebra Σ
of ‘events’ (subsets of the sample space Ω) and a probability measure P (for
background on probability theory, see [2]).
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Suppose that E1, E2, . . . are increasing (i.e. Ei ⊆ Ei+1) and E =
⋃∞
n=1En.
For example, suppose that En is the event that some particular ‘situation’ (e.g.
extinction of the population) has arisen on or before a given time step n (e.g.
day, year). These events are increasing and their union E is the event that
the ‘situation’ eventually arises. We are interested in when P(E) = 1. A
sufficient condition to guarantee this is to impose any non-zero lower bound
on the probability that the ‘situation’ arises at time step n given that it has
not done so already; in other words, to require that the conditional probability
P(En|En−1) is at least δ > 0 for all sufficiently large values of n (throughout
this paper an overline denotes the complementary event).
On the other hand, it is equally easy to check that if pn = P(En|En−1)
is allowed to converge to zero sufficiently quickly (so the probability of the
‘situation’ first arising on day n goes to zero sufficiently fast that
∑
n pn <∞),
then it is possible for P(E) < 1. For example, if accidents occur independently
and the probability of a particular accident is reduced each year by 1% of its
current value, then there is a positive probability that no accident will ever
occur; but if the probability reduces at the rate 1, 12 ,
1
3 ,
1
4 ,
1
5 , · · · , then an accident
is guaranteed to eventually occur (by the second Borel–Cantelli lemma).
Rather than placing some lower bound on the probability that the situation
arises at time step n, we can, following [4], make a weaker assumption that if
the situation has not happened yet, there is always a non-vanishing chance that
it will occur some time in the future (formally, requiring merely that P(E|En) is
uniformly bounded away from 0). For maximal generality, we also wish to avoid
any Markovian or independence assumptions. The following lemma provides a
sufficient condition for P(E) = 1 without any further assumptions, and uses an
elementary argument that will be useful later.
Lemma 1. Suppose En is an increasing sequence with limit E and suppose that
for some ǫ > 0, P(E|En) ≥ ǫ holds for all n ≥ 1. Then P(E) = 1.
Proof: Let pn = P (En). Then, by the law of total probability:
P(E) = P(E|En)(1− pn) + P(E|En)pn.
Now, P(E|En) = 1 and, by assumption, P(E|En) ≥ ǫ. Therefore:
P(E) ≥ ǫ(1− pn) + pn.
Since the events En are increasing, a well known and elementary result in
probability theory ensures that P(E) = limn→∞ pn. So, letting n → ∞ in the
previous inequality gives:
P(E) ≥ ǫ(1− P(E)) + P(E),
which implies that P(E) = 1, as claimed. ✷
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2.1. Example 1
Consider population of a species where Xn denotes the size of the population
at time step n. The event En = {Xn = 0} is the event that the population is
extinct by time step n and this increasing sequence has the limit E equal to the
event of eventual extinction. In this setting, Lemma 1 provides the following
special case of Jagers’ theorem.
Corollary 2. Suppose that X1, X2, . . . , Xn is a sequence of non-negative real-
valued random variables that are absorbing at 0 and are constrained to lie be-
tween 0 and M . Moreover, suppose that for some δ > 0 and all positive integers
n we have: P(∃r : Xr = 0|Xn 6= 0) ≥ δ. Then, with probability 1, a value n
exists for which Xk = 0 for all k ≥ n.
✷
2.2. Remarks
(a) One might view Lemma 1 as a simple formulation of ‘Murphy’s Law’ – the
idea that if something bad can happen, it will at some point (a popular
claim often made in jest that has an interesting history [6]). In that
context, En is simply the event that the ‘bad thing’ has happened on or
before day n.
(b) The proof of Proposition 1 shows that limn→∞ P(E|En) > 0 =⇒ P(E) =
1. The converse also holds, provided that P(En) < 1 for all n; indeed
under that restriction, a sharper limit can be stated: P(E) = 1 =⇒
limn→∞ P(E|En) = 1. With a view towards Borel–Cantelli type results,
note also that one can have:
∑
n≥1 P(E|En) = ∞ and P(E) < 1, if, for
example, P(En) = q −
1
n
, where q < 1.
(c) A general characterisation for when P(E) = 1 is the following result from
[1].
Proposition 1. If En is an increasing sequence of events with limit E,
then P(E) = 1 if and only if either P(E1) = 1 or P(Ei|Ei−1) = 1 for some
i, or
∑∞
i=1 P(Eti |Eti−1) =∞ for some strictly increasing sequence ti.
3. A convergence in probability result for Xn
We now consider what happens if the population size is not bounded above
by some maximal valueM as in Corollary 2. In this case, by weakening the con-
ditioning in Inequality (1) to just X ∈ (0,m], one can still derive a result a result
concerning convergence in probability (rather than almost sure convergence) of
the population size to 0 or infinity, as we now show.
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Proposition 2. Suppose that X1, X2, . . . , Xn is a sequence of non-negative real-
valued random variables that are absorbing at 0, and that for each positive integer
m, there is a value δm > 0 for which the following holds for all values of n:
P(∃r : Xr = 0|Xn ∈ (0,m]) ≥ δm. (2)
Then, for every m ≥ 1, we have limn→∞ P(Xn = 0 ∪Xn > m) = 1.
Proof: Throughout this proof we will let E denote the event {∃r : Xr = 0}.
The proof of Proposition 2 relies on the following result.
Claim: Both P(Xn = 0|Xn ≤ m) and P(E|Xn ≤ m) converge to 1
as n→∞.
Proposition 2 follows directly from this claim, since, for any m ≥ 1:
P(Xn = 0 ∪Xn > m) = P(Xn = 0) + P(Xn > m)
≥ P(Xn = 0|Xn ≤ m)P(Xn ≤ m) + P(Xn > m).
By the claim, P(Xn = 0|Xn ≤ m) converges to 1 as n grows, and so the previous
inequality ensures that limn→∞ P(Xn = 0 ∪Xn > m) = 1, as required. Thus it
suffices to establish the claim.
Proof of Claim: Consider any subsequence n(k) of positive integers for which
the bounded sequence P(Xn(k) ≤ m) has a limit. Such subsequences exist
(by the Bolzano–Weierstrass theorem), and since lim infn→∞ P(Xn ≤ m) > 0
(by (2)) for all m ≥ 1, the limit of P(Xn(k) ≤ m) for any such subsequence
is strictly positive (this latter observation also ensures that some conditional
probabilities below are well defined for large enough values of k). By the law of
total probability:
P(E|Xn(k) ≤ m) = P(E|Xn(k) = 0)P(Xn(k) = 0|Xn(k) ≤ m)
+P(E|Xn(k) ∈ (0,m])P(Xn(k) > 0|Xn(k) ≤ m).
Thus if we let pk = P(Xn(k) = 0|Xn(k) ≤ m), then, by (2):
P(E|Xn(k) ≤ m) ≥ 1 · pk + δm(1− pk). (3)
Now, pk = P(Xn(k) = 0)/P(Xn(k) ≤ m) and so limk→∞ pk =
limk→∞ P(Xn(k)=0)
limk→∞ P(Xn(k)≤m)
,
since the numerator and denominator limits are non-zero. Moreover, we have
P(E) = limk→∞ P(Xn(k) = 0) and so:
lim
k→∞
pk = lim
k→∞
P(E|Xn(k) ≤ m). (4)
Let p denote the shared limit in Eqn. (4). Then, from Inequality (3) we have:
p ≥ p+ δm(1− p),
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which implies that p = 1. Thus, for all subsequences n(k) of positive integers
for which P(Xn(k) ≤ m) has a limit, this limit takes the same value (namely 1).
It follows from a well-known result in analysis (e.g. Theorem 11, p. 67 of [5])
that the full sequence P(Xn ≤ m) also converges to 1 as n→∞, and, therefore,
so do the sequences P(Xn = 0|Xn ≤ m) and P(E|Xn ≤ m). This establishes
the two limit claims in the Claim, and so completes the proof of Proposition 2.
✷
Notice that Proposition 2 also implies Corollary 2 by taking m = M and
δm = δ in (2).
3.1. The conclusion of Proposition 2 cannot be strengthened to almost sure con-
vergence.
Suppose X1, X2, . . . , Xn . . . is a sequence of non-negative real-valued random
variables that satisfy the conditions described in Proposition 2. In this case,
the proposition assures us that Xn converges in probability either to 0 or to
infinity. This is a weaker conclusion than the statement that, with probability
1, either Xn = 0 for all sufficiently large n, or Xn → ∞. We now show, by
an explicit example, that such a stronger conclusion (which holds under the
stronger condition (1) required for Jagers’ theorem) need not hold under just
the conditions described in Proposition 2. In other words, some additional
conditioning on the past history of the process is required in order to secure the
stronger conclusion (we describe this further in the next section).
3.2. Example 2
Consider the following process. Let X1n, n ≥ 1 be a sequence of independent
random variables with:
P(X1n) =
{
1, with probability 1
n
;
n, otherwise.
For each k ≥ 2, let Xkn, n ≥ 1 be the (deterministic) random variables defined
by:
P(Xkn) =
{
1, with probability 1 for all n ∈ [1, . . . , 2k);
0, with probability 1 for all n ≥ 2k.
Now, let Xn be the stochastic process which selects K = k with probability
1
2k (for k = 1, 2, . . .) and then takes Xn to be the process X
K
n for all n ≥ 1.
Firstly, note that this mixture process is well defined, since
∑
k≥1 P(K =
k) = 1. Next, observe that since X1n = 1 infinitely often (with probability 1) by
the Borel–Cantelli Lemma (for independent random variables) and since there
is a probability of 12 that Xn = X
1
n for all n, then, with probability
1
2 , Xn does
not converge to infinity or hit zero (note that X1n 6= 0 for any n, and X
1
n returns
to 1 infinitely often and so does not tend to infinity).
Thus, to establish the claim regarding our example it suffices to show that
Inequality (2) applies. This can be verified, and the details are provided in the
Appendix.
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4. An extended extinction dichotomy theorem
The example in the previous section shows that in (2) we need to supplement
the condition Xn ∈ (0,m] with some further information concerning the past
history of the process, in order to guarantee eventual extinction or Xn → ∞.
Here, we provide a mild extension of Theorem 2 of [4] by conditioning on the
number of times the process has dipped below each given value m up to the
present step of the process.
Theorem 3. Suppose X1, X2, . . . , Xn . . . is a sequence of non-negative real-
valued random variables that are absorbing at 0. For each positive integer m ≥ 1,
let κm(X1, . . . , Xn−1) count the number of X1, X2, . . . , Xn−1 that are less than
or equal to m. Suppose that for each positive integer m, there exists δm > 0 for
which the following holds for all n.:
P(∃r : Xr = 0|Xn ∈ (0,m], κm(X1, . . . , Xn−1)) ≥ δm. (5)
Then, with probability 1, either Xn →∞ or a value of n exists for which Xk = 0
for all k ≥ n.
Proof: For any strictly positive integers n and m, let En be the event that
Xn = 0 and let Jm be the event that Xk ≤ m for infinitely many values of
k. Notice that En and Jm are both increasing sequences. Moreover, if we let
E =
⋃
n≥1En, J =
⋃
m≥1 Jm and J =
⋂
m≥1 Jm, then E is the event that some
k exists such that Xk = 0 and J is the event that Xn → ∞. We wish to show
the following:
P(E ∪ J) = 1. (6)
Notice that:
E ⊆ Jm for each m ≥ 1. (7)
Furthermore, P(E) > 0 by Inequality (5) applied to n = 1, and any value of
m ≥ 1 for which P(X1 ≤ m) > 0. Thus, from (7), P(Jm) > 0 (and so P(J) > 0
also), so the conditional probabilities P(E|J) and P(E|Jm) are well defined, and
for each m ≥ 1, the inclusion (7) gives:
P(E) = P(E|Jm)P(Jm). (8)
We will show that:
P(E|Jm) = 1 for each m ≥ 1, (9)
which, combined with Eqn. (8), gives P(E) = P(Jm) for each m ≥ 1. Thus,
since P(J) = limm→∞ P(Jm) (recall Jm are increasing), we have P(E) = P(J),
and consequently P(E) + P(J) = 1, since E and J are mutually exclusive. In
this way we obtain the required identity (6) that establishes the theorem.
Thus it suffices to establish Eqn. (9). For this we employ a coupling-style
argument. For each positive integerm, we will associate toXn a second sequence
of random variables Yk, k ≥ 1 as follows. Let Om = {n ≥ 1 : Xn ≤ m}, and
for each k ≤ |Om|, let Yk = Xν(k) where the random variable ν(k) is the k
th
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element of Om under the natural ordering of the positive integers. If Om is
finite, then set Yk = 0 for all k > |Om| (notice that this will not occur when we
condition on Jm below).
We may assume that the joint probability P(Yk 6= 0, Jm) is strictly positive;
otherwise P(Yk = 0|Jm) = 1 and so (9) holds, since P(Yk = 0|Jm) ≤ P(E|Jm).
Consequently, the conditional probabilities are well defined in the following
equation:
P(E|Yk 6= 0, Jm) =
∑
n≥1
P(E|Xn ∈ (0,m], ν(k) = n, Jm)·P(ν(k) = n|Yk 6= 0, Jm).
(10)
From (7) and (5), we obtain the following equality and inequality, respectively:
P(E|Xn ∈ (0,m], ν(k) = n, Jm) ≥ P(E|Xn ∈ (0,m], ν(k) = n) ≥ δm, (11)
where the first inequality is from (7) and the second inequality is from (5),
since conditioning on the conjunction Xn ∈ (0,m], ν(k) = n is equivalent to
conditioning on the conjunction of Xn ∈ (0,m] and κm(X1, . . . , Xn−1) = k− 1.
Substituting (11) into the right-hand side of (10) gives P(E|Yk 6= 0, Jm) ≥ δm.
Thus, we have:
P(E|Jm) = P(E|Yk 6= 0, Jm)P(Yk 6= 0|Jm) + 1 · P(Yk = 0|Jm) (12)
≥ δm(1 − pk) + 1 · pk,
where pk = P(Yk = 0|Jm), and where the factor 1 is because, conditional on Jm,
the event E occurs whenever Yk = 0. Now, {Yk = 0} is an increasing sequence
in k, so if we let Y :=
⋃
k≥1{Yk = 0}, then:
p := lim
k→∞
pk = P(Y|Jm). (13)
Moreover:
P(E|Jm) = P(Y|Jm). (14)
Applying (13) and (14) into (12) gives: p ≥ δm(1−p)+p, which, in turn, implies
that p = 1 (since δm > 0). Thus, P(E|Jm) = p = 1, which establishes (9) and
so completes the proof.
✷
5. Concluding remarks
Notice that Theorem 3 implies Theorem 2 of [4], since the lower bound (5)
involves conditioning on aggregates of values for X1, . . . , Xn, so it holds auto-
matically under the lower bound (1). Notice also that the proof of Theorem 3,
though longer than the elegant martingale argument for Theorem 2 of [4], re-
quires merely elementary notions in probability.
It turns out that the collection of random variables κm(X1, . . . , Xk) across
all (real) values of m and all integer values of k between 1 and n suffices to
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determine the sequence of random variables X1, . . . , Xn (by induction on k),
so it is not immediately clear that Theorem 3 really allows greater generality
than Theorem 2 of [4]. Therefore we provide an example to show that this
is indeed the case. Informally, the extra generality in Theorem 3, arises from
imposing fewer inequalities: in (5) there are n inequalities corresponding to
the n possible values that κm(X1, . . . , Xn−1) can take, while in (1), there are
potentially infinitely many, corresponding to all possible values forX1, . . . , Xn−1
(and for Xn ≤ x).
5.1. Example 3
Roughly speaking, the stochastic process we will construct becomes extinct
unless it oscillates regularly within a fixed range for an initial period, and the
longer that it oscillates the greater the chance that it will escape to infinity
rather than become extinct. We show that such a process satisfies (5) but not
(1).
First, consider a simple Markov chain Yn on the three states 0, 1, 2 that
starts in state 2 (i.e. Y1 = 2 with probability 1) and with transition probabilities
described as follows:
• 0 is an absorbing state;
• from state 1 or state 2, the next state is chosen with equal probability (13 )
from 0,1,2.
Thus, with probability 1, a value n exists for which Yk = 0 for all k ≥ n.
We will say that a sequence of values y1, y2, y3, . . . , yk from {1, 2} is a ter-
minated flip sequence (of length k) if y1 = 2 and yi = yi−1 only for i = k. For
example (2, 1, 2, 1, 2, 1, 2, 1, 1) and (2, 1, 2, 1, 2, 2) are terminated flip sequences
of lengths nine and six respectively.
We use Yn to define our process Xn which takes non-negative integer values
as follows. If there is no value N ≥ 4 for which Y1, Y2, . . . YN is a terminated
flip sequence, then set Xn = Yn for all n; in which case Xn absorbs at 0 with
probability 1. On the other hand, if a value N ≥ 4 exists for which Y1, Y2, . . . YN
is a terminated flip sequence, then, conditional on this value of N , Xn = Yn
for all n ≤ N , and for n > N , Xn = Z
N
n−N , where Z
N
1 , Z
N
2 , . . . is a second
Markov chain on the state space {0}∪{N−1, N,N+1, N+2, . . .}. This second
chain has Z1 = N − 1 (with probability 1), and has transitions from each state
i ≥ N − 1 to 0 and to i+ 1 with probabilities of 2−i and 1− 2−i, respectively.
Notice that, although the process Xn is absorbing at 0, it fails to satisfy (1)
since, for an terminated flip sequence (x1, x2, . . . , xn), of length 4 or more, we
have xn ≤ 2 and yet:
P(∃r : Xr = 0| ∧
n
i=1 {Xi = xi}) =
∞∑
j=n−1
1
2j
→ 0, as n→∞.
To show that Xn satisfies (5), we consider the casesm = 1, m = 2 andm > 2
separately. For m = 1, (5) is equivalent to the following inequality holding for
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all n ≥ 1:
P(∃r : Xr = 0|Xn = 1, κ1(X1, . . . , Xn−1)) ≥ δ1 > 0. (15)
Now, if κ1(X1, . . . , Xn−1) 6= ⌊(n−1)/2⌋ then X1, . . . , Xn cannot be a terminated
flip sequence, and so, with probability at least 13 , we have Xn+1 = 0. On
the other hand, if κ1(X1, . . . , Xn−1) = ⌊(n − 1)/2⌋ then the probability that
Y1, Y2, . . . , Yn is a terminated flip sequence of length 4 or more is bounded away
from 1 as n grows, and so the event {∃r : Xr = 0} has a probability that is
bounded away from 0 for all n when we condition on κ1(X1, . . . , Xn−1) and
Xn = 1. Thus a value δ1 > 0 can be chosen to satisfy (15) for all n ≥ 1.
For m = 2, (5) is equivalent to the following inequality holding for all n ≥ 1:
P(∃r : Xr = 0|Xn ∈ (0, 2]) ≥ δ2 > 0. (16)
Notice that κ2 has vanished, since Xn ∈ (0, 2] implies that κ2(X1, . . . , Xn−1) =
n− 1 with probability 1. Now, conditional on Xn ∈ (0, 2], the probability that
Y1, Y2, . . . , Yn is a terminated flip sequence of length 4 or more is bounded away
from 1 as n grows, and so the event {∃r : Xr = 0} has a probability that is
bounded away from 0 for all n when we condition onXn ∈ {1, 2}. Thus a value
δ2 > 0 can be chosen to satisfy (16) for all n ≥ 1.
Finally, for each m > 2, for all n ≥ 1:
P(∃r : Xr = 0|Xn ∈ (0,m], κm(X1, . . . , Xn−1)) ≥ 2
−m > 0,
so we can set δm = 2
−m for all m > 2. In summary, for all values of m, Xn
satisfies (5) for all n, as claimed.
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8. Appendix: Proof that Example 2 satisfies Inequality (2)
Firstly, if m < 1, then conditioning on Xn ≤ m is equivalent to conditioning
on K > 1 and so we can take any positive value for δm (even = 1) and satisfy
Inequality (2).
Next, suppose that m ≥ 1, and, for any n ≥ 1, write:
n = 2q + r, where 0 ≤ r < 2q, q ≥ 0. (17)
SInce P(∃r : Xr = 0|Xn ∈ (0,m]) = P(K > 1|Xn ∈ (0,m]) we have:
P(∃r : Xr = 0|Xn ∈ (0,m]) =
∑
k≥2
P(K = k|Xn ∈ (0,m]), (18)
and, from Bayes’ identity:
P(K = k|Xn ∈ (0,m]) =
P(Xn ∈ (0,m]|K = k)P(K = k)
P(Xn ∈ (0,m])
. (19)
Now, for any k ≥ 2 (and still with m > 1):
P(Xn ∈ (0,m]|K = k) =
{
1, provided k ≥ q + 1;
0, otherwise;
(20)
since Xkn = 1 with probability 1 for all n ∈ [1, . . . , 2
k). Consequently, the
numerator of (19) equals 12k ( = P(K = k)) when k ≥ q+1 and is zero otherwise.
Now, the denominator of (19), namely P(Xn ∈ (0,m]), can be written as:
∑
k≥2
P(Xn ∈ (0,m]|K = k)P(K = k)

+P(Xn ∈ (0,m]|K = 1)P(K = 1). (21)
From (20), the first term in (21) is:
∑
k≥2
P(Xn ∈ (0,m]|K = k)P(K = k) =
∑
k≥q+1
1
2k
=
1
2q
. (22)
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Regarding the second term in (21), observe that:
P(Xn ∈ (0,m]|K = 1) =
{
1
n
, provided n > m;
1, if n ≤ m.
Therefore, recalling (17), the second term in (21) is:{
1
n
× 12 =
1
2q+1+2r ≤
1
2q+1 , provided n > m;
1× 12 , when n ≤ m.
(23)
Consequently, by combining (21), (22) and (23) into (19) (and noting again
that
∑
k≥q+1
1
2k
= 12q ) we have that if n > m, then
∑
k≥2 P(K = k|Xn ∈
(0,m]) ≥
1
2q
1
2q +
1
2q+1
≥ 12 , while if n ≤ m, then
∑
k≥2 P(K = k|Xn ∈ (0,m]) ≥
1
2q
1
2q +
1
2
≥
1
2q
1+ 12
≥ 23 ·
1
2q ≥
2
3m , where the last inequality is from m ≥ n ≥ 2
q.
Thus, if we take δ1 =
1
2 and δm =
2
3m for each m ≥ 2, then, from (18),
P(∃r : Xr = 0|Xn ∈ (0,m]) ≥ δm for all n,m, as claimed.
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